Baccalaureate Services Permitted at Public High School

Alabama court rules in favor of church.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama

Church Law and Tax 1993-01-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• Must a public high school rent its auditorium to a church that wants to conduct a baccalaureate service for graduating seniors and their families? Yes, concluded a federal district court in Alabama. The church requested permission to rent the school auditorium since no local church was large enough to accommodate the expected crowd. The school routinely rented its auditorium to a wide variety of community groups at a fee of $200 per day, but the school board rejected the church’s request since it would involve a religious service. The church asked a court to issue an order requiring the school to rent its facility to the church for the baccalaureate service. The court agreed. It noted that when public property is opened to a wide range of community groups, it becomes a “public forum,” and as such it must be available to any group regardless of the content of its speech. The court concluded that the school had created a public forum by making its auditorium available to a wide range of community groups, and accordingly it could not deny the same privilege to a church solely on the basis of the religious nature of the intended use. Verbena United Methodist Church v. Chilton County, 765 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Ala. 1991).

© Copyright 1993, 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m47 c0193

Legal Developments

Church Parking Lots and Zoning Law

Court rules that a church’s planned parking lot would violate zoning law.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Church Property, Zoning

Church Law and Tax 1992-03-01 Recent Developments

Zoning

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that a church could not create a parking lot on land located across the street from the church. A Baptist church purchased land across the street from the church building in order to expand its parking facilities. Neighboring landowners complained that such a use of the property was not permitted by local zoning law. A local zoning board ruled in favor of the church. It reasoned that churches were permitted uses in the area in question, and that a church parking lot should be permitted as an “accessory use” by a church. The neighbors appealed to a state appeals court, which reversed the decision of the zoning board and prohibited the church from establishing the parking lot. The case was then appealed to the state supreme court, which agreed with the appeals court that the parking lot should not be allowed. The court noted that the local zoning ordinance defined an accessory use as a use “on the same lot with” the principal use or structure. The court concluded that “the definition of accessory use in the ordinance is consistent with the general rule that the accessory use must be located on the same lot as the building to which it is accessory.” Since the proposed parking lot was across the street from the church, it was not “on the same lot” and accordingly could not be permitted as an accessory use. Such a crabbed interpretation of the zoning ordinance is highly questionable, and undoubtedly will lead to serious problems for larger churches in communities with similar ordinances, since they will not be able to construct parking lots beyond the square block on which the church is located. Such an interpretation raises serious questions under the first amendment’s religion clauses, since it will definitely result in discriminatory treatment of larger churches. Ex parte Fairhope Board of Adjustments and Appeals, 567 So.2d 1353 (Ala. 1990).

Zoning Ordianance Ruled Unconstitutional

A court recently made an important ruling.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Church Property, Zoning

Church Law and Tax 1991-03-01 Recent Developments

Zoning

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• Does a county’s practice of prohibiting churches from building new facilities if neighboring residents object violate the churches’ constitutional right of religious freedom? Yes, concluded a federal district court in Alabama in an important ruling. A county adopted a new zoning ordinance that limited churches to “institutional districts.” The ordinance purposely failed to recognize any land as an institutional district, so that churches would be forced to seek a zoning variance before purchasing property for church use. This procedure was designed to give the county “better site development controls over institutional construction.” A Mormon congregation that had outgrown its existing facility attempted to purchase land on which it proposed to construct a new sanctuary. It filed an application to have the property rezoned as an “institutional district,” but its application was denied by the county following a hearing in which several neighboring residents expressed “vociferous opposition.” The residents lived in an affluent residential district adjacent to the church’s proposed building site, and they were horrified by the impact the church would have on the “aesthetics” of the community and the value of existing homes. The county commission based its denial of the church’s application on the basis of the “will of the people.” One commissioner stated that churches should not locate anywhere that they are not wanted. The court noted that the church had outgrown its present facility, and that the church had “as a central tenet of its faith the need to assemble together and strengthen the faith of each other and to partake of communion.” The court concluded that the church’s constitutional right to exercise its religion was violated by the county’s procedure: “It is undisputed that the primary, if not the sole, policy reason for establishing the [county’s institutional district] system was to give it ‘site control’ …. The court recognizes that the [county is] allowed to consider … neighborhood aesthetics. On the other hand, it is too great a burden on religious interests to allow this to be determined [in each case] based upon neighborhood opposition …. Allowing churches to go only where they are welcome smacks of an unreasonable burden, even if the opposition is not related to the denomination of the church …. The court’s primary conclusion is that the burden here on religion is that the ability of a church to locate or not is dependent on the acceptability of that church, or any church, to the surrounding community, without there having been any predetermination that churches are allowed to go in any area.” This case will lend support to the right of churches to acquire land for church use if (1) no land is zoned for church use, and churches are required to apply for a zoning variance for any land that they purchase for church use, and (2) the decision whether or not to grant the zoning variance depends on opposition or support by neighboring residents. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson County, 741 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1990).

© Copyright 1991, 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m82 m47 c0291

Legal Developments

Freedom of Religion

Church Law and Tax 1990-09-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Freedom of Religion, Schools

Church Law and Tax 1990-09-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• To what extent can a university professor share his religious beliefs during class? That was the issue before a federal district court in Alabama. A state university professor occasionally referred to his religious beliefs during class lectures, and organized voluntary, after-class meetings to discuss the religious implications of the course material. When a few students complained of the classroom comments and after-class meetings, the university investigated the matter and issued a memorandum prohibiting the professor from injecting his religious beliefs and preferences during instructional time, and banning his after-class meetings. When the professor’s attempts to have the university rescind the memorandum proved unsuccessful, he filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the school was interfering with his constitutional right to freely exercise his religion. The court agreed with the professor. The court began its opinion by emphasizing that “university professors are entitled to freedom of speech in their jobs,” and that the “classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.” It observed that the university did not prohibit faculty members from engaging in non-religious classroom speech involving personal views, and did not prohibit faculty members from organizing after-class meetings for discussing ideas from a non-religious perspective. Accordingly, the university has “created a forum for students and their professors to engage in a free interchange of ideas” and “it may not exclude unfavored religious speech unless the exclusion is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest ….” The university countered that its policy was necessary in order to avoid “establishing a religion.” The court summarily rejected this defense, concluding that “the university has no interest sufficient to justify restricting a professor’s freedom to make occasional classroom comments about personal religious beliefs or to restrict him from holding after-class meetings with students on state university property to discuss a Christian perspective on academic topics.” Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990).

© Copyright 1990, 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m47 c0690

Legal Developments

Church Property – Part 2

Church Law and Tax 1990-05-01 Recent Developments Church Property Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Church Property

Church Law and Tax 1990-05-01 Recent Developments

Church Property

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• Churches may obtain ownership of property through “adverse possession.” That was the conclusion of the Alabama Supreme Court in a recent decision. A property owner executed a deed transferring a tract of property to his son in 1958. This deed was not recorded until 1985. In 1960, the original owner conveyed the same property to a church, which promptly recorded its deed and used the property openly and without interruption until the original owner’s son claimed title to the property in 1986. The church rejected the son’s claim of ownership, and a lawsuit ensued. The court ruled that the church owned the property through “adverse possession.” It observed that “to obtain title by adverse possession, a claimant must prove possession of the land, openness, notoriety and exclusiveness of possession under claim of right … and continuity for the statutory period of ten years. These elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” The court concluded that the church satisfied this definition since it “has been in actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession of the disputed property for over 39 years.” Pogue v. White Stone Baptist Church, 554 So.2d 981 (Ala. 1989).

Legal Developments

Church Property – Part 3

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments Church Property Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Church Property

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments

Church Property

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the claim of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States (PECUSA) to the property of a local church that voted unanimously to disaffiliate from the parent body. The church voted to disaffiliate from the PECUSA because of disagreement with certain denominational policies, and a dispute arose between the church and PECUSA regarding ownership of the church’s property. A trial court found that the local congregation was the rightful owner of its property, but a state appeals court reversed this decision. The congregation appealed the case to the state supreme court, which ruled in favor of the local church. The court emphasized that: (1) the congregation’s withdrawal from the PECUSA “was unequivocal, and there was no dissenting faction”; (2) the “church property was acquired exclusively by the efforts of the local congregation”; (3) through the years title to the property was held by the church trustees and later by the church when it incorporated; and (4) the church “freely engaged in transactions such as purchase, encumbrance, and sale of its real property without any involvement by PECUSA”. Such evidence, observed the court, created an “appearance of absolute ownership” in the local church. However, the PECUSA maintained that certain denominational documents imposed a trust on the local church’s property in favor the national church, and that in any event the civil courts were required to defer to the conclusions of a hierarchical denomination such as the PECUSA (under the so-called “compulsory deference rule”). Both of these contentions were rejected by the court. As to the documents, the court concluded that (1) they were ambiguous, and accordingly could not create a trust in the absence of a “reversionary clause” in favor of the PECUSA, and (2) the PECUSA had never previously regarded the documents as having any legal effect. The court refused to adopt the “compulsory deference rule,” choosing instead the “neutral principles of law” approach to resolving church property disputes. Under the neutral principles approach, a court resolves church property disputes on the basis of nondoctrinal language in deeds, charters, and the bylaws of both the local church and parent denomination. Under this approach, the court concluded that the local church and not the PECUSA was the rightful owner of the property in question since nondoctrinal language in the church’s charter and deed clearly vested title in the local church. The court concluded: “It should be remembered that [the church] acquired the property with no assistance from PECUSA; that the property was managed and maintained exclusively by the church; that the church improved and added to its property; and that PECUSA deliberately avoided acquisition of title or entanglement with the property to ensure that it would not be subject to civil liability. The record is clear that PECUSA’s relationship with the church was exclusively ecclesiastical and the church was at all times in control of its temporal affairs.” Two dissenting justices argued that a document executed by the church 81 years earlier did create a trust in favor of the PECUSA. They observed that the church “enjoyed the benefits of membership in PECUSA for many long years—its members were confirmed by the bishop … its clergy participated in a PECUSA pension plan, PECUSA insured the church, and the church regularly asked for and received help and advice from the bishop …. Because of disagreement with national church policy, the church cannot now repudiate a legal document executed 81 years ago.” Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988).

© Copyright 1989, 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m21 m39 c0389

Legal Developments

Church Property – Part 1

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments Church Property Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Church Property

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments

Church Property

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• The Alabama Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a local church or a parent denomination owned the church’s property following its disaffiliation from the denomination. Here are the facts. A local church had been affiliated with the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America since 1908. In 1985, a majority of the church’s membership voted to disaffiliate with the parent denomination. The denomination wrote the church a letter acknowledging the disaffiliation, and requesting all dissident members to vacate the premises. Dissident members refused to vacate the property, and the denomination filed a lawsuit seeking to have itself declared the owner of the church’s property. In support of its claim, the denomination quoted a provision contained (since 1884) in its Book of Discipline that pertained to local church property: “In trust, that said premises shall be used, kept, maintained, and disposed of as a place of divine worship for the use of the ministry and membership of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, subject to the discipline, usage and ministerial appointments of said church as from time to time authorized and declared by the General Conference of said church.” A trial court awarded the church property to the local church, finding that the church was not in a hierarchical relationship with the denomination with respect to property matters. The denomination appealed to the state supreme court, which found the trial court’s determination to be “reversible error” and ruled in favor of the denomination. The court began its opinion by acknowledging that “the civil courts cannot adjudicate disputes concerning spiritual or ecclesiastical matters, but, nevertheless, can resolve disputes concerning property rights.” In resolving church property disputes, the courts of Alabama apply “neutral principles of law”—meaning nondoctrinal language in deeds, charters, and the constitutions and bylaws of both the local church and the parent denomination. The court surveyed the close ties that had existed between the local church and parent denomination in the 77 years of affiliation, and noted that since 1884 every prospective member of a church affiliated with the denomination had agreed to be “cheerfully governed” by the denomination’s Book of Discipline. In light of such evidence, the supreme court concluded: “[The church] has been a member of [the denomination] for three-quarters of a century, by an association that both the national denomination and the local church acknowledge. For the entire time, the Book of Discipline provided that the church’s property be held for the denomination by the local church. Individuals who have been members of the church the longest acknowledge that, for as long as they can remember, everyone who became a member of the church promised to abide by the rules and regulations of the denomination. The church cannot now sever the relationship between the denomination and itself and unilaterally declare that obligations incumbent upon itself because of three-quarters of a century of association do not exist. The church’s choice to join the denomination means it is obligated to obey all the rules and regulations its members promised to uphold, not just the rules and regulations they prefer. At least in regard to property disputes, the Book of Discipline binds the local church.” African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, Inc. v. Zion Hill Methodist Church, Inc., 534 So.2d 224 (Ala. 1988).

Legal Developments

Church Membership

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments Church Membership Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments

Church Membership

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• Can a court determine which members in a Baptist church are qualified to vote in a church election? No, concluded the Alabama Supreme Court. A dispute arose in a local Baptist church, and certain members petitioned a state trial court to order a church election to resolve the matter. At the election the votes of 35 individuals were challenged and not counted. The result of the ballots counted was a 74 to 74 tie. One group of members petitioned the court to have the challenged votes counted. The trial court refused to grant this request, noting that “if this court ordered the challenged ballots to be counted, it would be determining that they were members who were eligible to vote. This it cannot do ….” The court acknowledged that its refusal to order the challenged ballots to be counted “leaves the [church] without redress in the courts for even arbitrary acts of a preacher in either falsely challenging voters or intentionally bringing in non-members to vote.” However, the trial court concluded that “there is nothing this court can do about it” since prior rulings of the Alabama Supreme Court prohibited courts from resolving church membership issues. The trial court’s ruling was appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which agreed that its previous rulings “do not authorize courts to determine the eligibility of church members to vote,” and that “to order that certain votes be counted, which theretofore were not counted, would have been tantamount to doing that very thing, i.e., determining eligibility.” The supreme court concluded: “In each Baptist church the majority of the members of the church control the business of the church. Also, all the members of a Baptist church are entitled to vote at a congregational meeting, regardless of age. However, the issue as to which members are eligible to vote is a matter within the discretion of the members of the church …. Because each Baptist church is a democratic institution whose membership possesses the right to vote, perforce it is the church itself under its rules that must examine the eligibility of its individual members to participate in that democracy.” Mount Olive Baptist Church v. Williams, 529 So.2d 972 (Ala. 1988).

Legal Developments

Personal Injuries – Part 1

On Church Property or During Church Activities

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments

Personal Injuries – On Church Property or During Church Activities

Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA

• In a case of great significance to religious denominations and church agencies, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that a Catholic order was not legally responsible for the actions of a priest who had entered an abortion clinic and injured a woman while destroying several pieces of equipment with a sledge hammer. The priest, a member of the Benedictine Society, had been appointed pastor of a local parish and “pro-life coordinator” for the Birmingham diocese by the bishop. The injured woman sued the Benedictine Society and the priest’s immediate superior (an abbot), claiming that the priest was an “agent” of the society and accordingly that the society was legally responsible for his conduct. In particular, she argued that the priest “was a member of the society and, as such, was subject to [his abbot’s] orders as it related to his 24-hour life as a monk, including the authority to recall him to the abbey. The evidence established that [the abbot] knew of at least one previous act of violence on the [priest’s] part, but failed or refused to exercise any discipline over him because of it. Finally, it established that [the priest] was driving a society-owned car when he went to [the abortion clinic] and attacked the [plaintiff].” The trial court disagreed that these allegations proved an agency relationship that gave rise to legal liability on the part of the society or abbot, and the case was appealed to the state supreme court.

The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff had produced no evidence demonstrating an agency relationship between the society and the priest: “The Benedictine Order is a clerical order. [The priest] is a monk in that society and [the abbot] is his superior. However, the relationship between [the priest] and the society was ecclesiastical and did not necessarily create a … principal/agent relationship. Furthermore, the fact that [the priest] is a monk 24 hours a day does not necessarily mean that his membership in the society makes the society liable for all of his actions.” The court further observed that “the law with regard to ecclesiastical orders and religious societies to be that the relationship is essentially ecclesiastical in nature. I would analogize this to situations where a young man may be in a seminary and the seminary is asked to supply a preacher or a minister for a congregation. The fact that the young minister may have some alma mater does not make the seminary responsible for his behavior in the event he elects to commit a burglary or some other act which he might consider to be ordained by divine aegis or providence. It would not in and of itself make the seminary responsible for his behavior.” Similarly, “the plaintiff must have evidence in addition to the fact that [the priest] was a member of the Benedictine Society of monks.” The court further noted that there was no evidence “that the Benedictine Society was acting in a principal-agency capacity with the [priest]. Further, the court finds there was no employment as that term implies or no employment in the sense required for negligent employment.” Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the fact that the priest had driven a society-owned car to the abortion clinic demonstrated that the priest was acting as an agent of the society and accordingly that the society was legally responsible for his actions. It noted that the priest “had access to the car for both business and personal use; therefore, the mere fact that he was driving the car does not, standing alone, constitute evidence that the society was responsible for [his] actions.” This case is significant for the following reasons: (1) It recognizes that the mere existence of ecclesiastical authority by a denominational agency over a minister does not, without more, make the minister an “agent” of the denomination. This is an important conclusion, since the actions of agents within the scope of their employment generally are attributable to their principals or employers. Many denominations and church agencies have been sued for injuries allegedly caused by clergy serving local churches, by plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking “deep pockets” out of which to satisfy a judgment. Cases such as this one will, hopefully, reduce the likelihood of such frivolous lawsuits that unfortunately result in enormous expenditures of time and money. Second, the court used an interesting analogy to support its conclusion—that of a seminary’s relationship with its graduates. The seminary confers a degree upon each graduate, but that action, standing alone, does not make the seminary liable for the subsequent actions of its graduates. Similarly, many denominations confer ecclesiastical credentials upon clergy, but this procedure, without more, should never authorize persons injured by the actions of a minister to sue the denomination. Third, the state supreme court affirmed a “directed verdict” by the trial court. A directed verdict is a decision by the trial judge, before the case is submitted to the jury, that the plaintiff’s case is not supported by any evidence and accordingly that the case need not be submitted to a jury. This is an extraordinary action for a trial court to take, and it is reserved for only the most meritless claims. The fact that such a verdict was involved in this case, and was upheld by the state supreme court, reinforces the position taken by the court. Wood v. Benedictine Society of Alabama, Inc., 530 So.2d 801 (Ala. 1988).

Legal Developments

Court Ruled It Was Proper to Inquire Whether a Congregational Meeting Was Preceded by Adequate Notice to the Full Membership

For many years, two factions within a local Baptist church had been at war with

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Charters, Constitutions, and Bylaws, Church Business Meetings

For many years, two factions within a local Baptist church had been at war with each other. Ultimately, the dissident minority was collectively expelled from membership. The expelled members continued to attend services, and frequently interrupted the pastor, sang, and engaged in disturbances that made the conduct of peaceful services impossible. The church sought a court order prohibiting the dissidents from disrupting or interfering with church services.

The dissidents, in response, asserted that the meeting at which the congregation voted to expel them had not been called with adequate notice; that the constitution and bylaws were invalid since they had been adopted at the same meeting; and that the pastor had appointed the church trustees without congregational approval. The dissidents also demanded an accounting of all church funds.

The trial court held that the meeting at which the dissidents had been expelled and at which the church constitution and bylaws had been adopted was invalid due to inadequate notice. It also scheduled an election at which the congregation would determine, by majority vote, the proper membership of the church; prescribed the notice to be given; provided for the counting of ballots by a court officer; and ordered an accounting of all church funds.

The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court, noting that "it is proper for the courts to inquire whether a congregational meeting, at which church business is to be transacted, was preceded by adequate notice to the full membership, and whether, once called, the meeting was conducted in an orderly manner and the expulsion was the act of the authority within the church having the power to order it." However, "once the court is presented with sufficient evidence regarding the regularity of the meeting, it will then generally refuse to inquire further as to the fruits of the meeting." McKinney v. Twenty-fifth Avenue Baptist Church, Inc., 514 So.2d 837 (Ala. 1987)

Legal Developments

Court Reversed Ruling Books Constituted an Impermissible Establishment of the “Religion of Secular Humanism”

A federal appeals court reversed a lower court ruling on books used in the Alabama public schools.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Freedom of Religion, Schools

A federal appeals court reversed a lower court ruling that 44 books used in the Alabama public schools constituted an impermissible establishment of the "religion of secular humanism."

The court observed that

"examination of the contents of these textbooks … reveals that the message conveyed is not one of endorsment of secular humanism or any religion. Rather, the message conveyed is one of a governmental attempt to instill in Alabama public school children such values as independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance, and logical decision-making. This is an entirely appropriate secular effect."

The message conveyed by the textbooks was one of neutrality

"the textbooks neither endorse theistic religion as a system of belief, nor discredit it." Further, "if we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds."

Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987)

Legal Developments

Textbooks that Omitted Religion Violated the First Amendment

A federal district court in Alabama ruled that public school textbooks that omitted reference to

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: Alabama
Categories: Freedom of Religion, Schools

A federal district court in Alabama ruled that public school textbooks that omitted reference to the significance of religion in American history and in current American life impermissibly promoted a religion of secular humanism in violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.

The court observed that though religion has been one of the most vital forces to shape our culture, "one would never know it by reading these books." Omitted were much of the history of the Puritans, the great awakenings, colonial missionaries (except when depicted as oppressors of native Americans), the religious influence behind the abolition of slavery, women's suffrage, temperance, and modern civil rights and peace movements, and the role of religion in the lives of immigrants and minorities.

"These books," concluded the court, "discriminate against the very concept of religion, and theistic religion in particular, by omissions so serious that a student learning history from them would not be apprised of relevant facts about America's history." Such deliberate underemphasis amounted to the establishment of the religion of humanism. Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987).