Freedom of Religion – Part 2

Church Law and Tax 1989-09-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-09-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Another federal appeals court ruled that a Christian student group could not meet on a public high school campus for Bible study and prayer prior to the start of the school day. The court noted that allowing the students to meet on school property would violate the first amendment’s nonestablishment of religion clause, since “it would have the primary effect of advancing religion, and it would foster government entanglement with religion.” The court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of students to meet in public university facilities for religious purposes if the facilities are made available to other groups. However, it concluded that there is a significant difference between high school and college students that warrants a different result: “Unlike university students, high school students are required to attend school. The instructional format at a high school is far more structured that at a university. High school students are less mature and more impressionable than university students. Teachers at high schools, unlike college professors, are both educators and authority figures. The same considerations that mandate special vigilance in preventing religious establishments in public schools—the impressionability of young students, compulsory attendance laws that make students a captive audience, and the role of public schools in inculcating democratic ideals—distinguish public secondary schools from public universities.” The court also rejected the students’ claim that the school’s refusal to allow them to meet violated the federal “Equal Access Act.” The Act (explained in the previous case summary) generally provides that a public high school cannot deny Christian students the right to meet on school property during “noninstructional” (i.e., nonschool) hours if the school has created a “limited public forum” by permitting “noncurriculum-related” groups to use the same facilities. The court concluded that the Act simply did not apply since the school did not allow any noncurriculum-related group to use school facilities during noninstructional hours and accordingly had not created a limited open forum. The ruling is controlling in the ninth federal judicial circuit (which includes the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington)—unless reversed or modified by the same court in a later decision, or by the United States Supreme Court. Garnett v. Renton School District, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).

Freedom of Religion – Part 4

Church Law and Tax 1989-07-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-07-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

A federal court in California ruled that a public employee could not be terminated on the basis of her religious practices. The employee, who had served as a secretary to a federal judge, alleged that she had been fired because the judge found her religious practices to be offensive. Specifically, she alleged that she was involved in the Charismatic Renewal Movement within the Roman Catholic Church, and that her religious practices included singing prayers and chants. While at the workplace, however, her religious practices were limited to silent prayer before meals. The court concluded that the judge would have violated her constitutional right to freely exercise her religion if he fired her solely because he was offended by her religious practices. It relied on an earlier decision in which a federal court in Tennessee ruled that an employee’s constitutional rights would be violated if he were fired for not attending his supervisor’s church. Garcia v. Williams, 704 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 2

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Can the state prosecute a mother for manslaughter if her child dies of meningitis after being treated by prayer instead of medical therapy? That was the difficult question before the California Supreme Court in a recent decision. The victim was a four-year-old girl who fell ill with flu-like symptoms and a stiff neck. Consistent with the tenets of her religion, the child’s mother chose to treat the illness with prayer rather than medical care. Members of the mother’s church prayed with the child on two occasions. Nevertheless, the child lost weight, grew disoriented and irritable, and her breathing became heavy and irregular. She died of acute meningitis 17 days after her symptoms first appeared. The child’s mother was charged with involuntary manslaughter, and she moved to dismiss the prosecution on the ground that her conduct was protected by law. Specifically, the mother argued that involuntary manslaughter is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice “in the commission of an unlawful act … or without due caution or circumspection,” and that her child had not died “in the commission of an unlawful act.” She pointed out that the only “unlawful act” for which she could have been charged was the criminal neglect of a child, and that California law exempted “treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone” from the definition of criminal neglect.

The state supreme court rejected the mother’s arguments, concluding that she could be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter. The court reasoned that the exemption of “treatment by spiritual means by prayer alone” from the definition of criminal neglect did not necessarily exempt such treatment from the crime of manslaughter. The court also rejected the mother’s claim that her actions were protected by the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. It observed that the mother’s constitutional rights were outweighed by a “compelling state interest” of “unparalleled significance”—the protection of children. If further noted that “parents may be free to become martyrs themselves … but it does not follow that they are free … to make martyrs of their children.” Walker v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 4

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

A federal court in Pennsylvania ruled that a state law regulating homeschooling was invalid. The law in question permitted homeschooling, but required “properly qualified private tutors” to provide the daily instruction. The term “qualified private tutor” was not adequately defined by the law, and this led to differing interpretations among the 501 school districts within the state. The court quoted one education expert who had testified that he “had heard everything that one can imagine, from persons qualified with an eighth grade education to Ph.Ds.” Such a law, concluded the court, was so vague that a parent who educated his or her children at home could not determine in advance whether such instruction was lawful under the state homeschooling law. Such a law is “unconstitutional for vagueness.” Jeffery v. O’Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516 (M.D. Pa. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 1

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Does a church have a legal right to conduct Sunday worship services in a public high school auditorium? No, concluded a federal district court in Nevada. A church of about 100 members had been meeting in a privately-owned auditorium. Its pastor asked local school officials if the church could rent the public high school auditorium on Sunday mornings. The school officials declined this request on the basis of a school policy prohibiting use of school facilities for religious uses. The church immediately filed a lawsuit against the school district, seeking a court order permitting use of the public high school auditorium on Sundays. In support of its case, the church argued that the high school permitted many non-religious groups to rent the auditorium, and it thereby had created an “open forum” that could not be denied to any group (including a church). The school district argued that its policy of denying access to its facilities by religious groups was required by the constitutional principle of “separation of church and state.” The court agreed that the school district had created an “open forum” by permitting various community groups to rent the high school auditorium. However, the court concluded that the district’s refusal to rent the auditorium to the church was justified, since rental of the facility to the church would “have the primary effect of advancing religion” in violation of the nonestablishment of religion clause of the federal constitution. The court stressed that the church desired to use the school auditorium as the “permanent site for its church services and activities.” It noted that the church “has no building site nor does it have any present plans to acquire a site or construct a church facility.” As a result, the high school “will become the physical embodiment of the church,” and in this sense the church’s request was “significantly different” from the requests of other community organizations to rent the facility, since no other community group sought to “become permanently institutionalized within the school.” The court cited with approval a previous federal court decision in Kansas in which a court upheld the right of a church to rent public school property on a temporary basis. Presumably, had the Nevada church requested permission to rent the school auditorium for a temporary period of time (e.g., until it constructed a new sanctuary), the court would have ruled in favor of the church. This conclusion is consistent with a number of previous court rulings. Wallace v. Washoe County School District, 701 F. Supp. 187 (D. Nev. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 3

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-05-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

The California Supreme Court ruled that two former members of the Unification Church could sue the Church for fraud and outrageous conduct. One of the members (David Molko) had been recruited by the Church in 1979 following his graduation from law school. He was approached by two Church members, while waiting for a bus, and was invited to a gathering of “socially conscious people from different occupations who met in the evenings to discuss important issues.” When asked if the group had a “religious connection,” the two Church members said no. They did not reveal to Molko that they were members of the Unification Church, or that their sole purpose in inviting him to dinner was to recruit him into the Church. Molko agreed to attend the dinner. Following the dinner there was a lecture on social problems after which there was a slide show about a “farm” a few hours away that was described as a “rural getaway where people went for relaxation and pleasure.” Molko agreed to visit the farm, and he was on his way in a Church-owned van within 15 minutes. Molko awoke the next morning expecting to spend some relaxing time in the country. He soon learned that each day’s schedule was tightly planned and left no time for solitude. First came calisthenics, then breakfast, then a lecture on moral issues, followed by small group discussions of the lecture. Next came lunch, more exercise, another lecture and discussion, then a break to take a shower. Finally came dinner, “testimonials” by individuals about their impressions of the day, and group singing followed by yet another small group discussion. At the end of the day, Molko was exhausted and quickly fell asleep. The following days were an exact repeat of the first day. Molko occasionally asked if the group was associated with any religious organization, and he was assured that it was not. On his 12th day at the farm, he was told by a member that the group was in fact part of the Unification Church. He expressed anger at being deceived for so many days, but allegedly was informed that “deception was necessary because people who had heard negative stories about the Church tended to be unreceptive if they knew the group’s identity before hearing what it had to say.” Molko agreed to stay and “work through his confusion.” He soon received nearly seven weeks of “advanced training,” after which he became a member of the Church and was judged “ready to go back to the city to sell flowers and witness for the Church.” Church leaders also encouraged Molko to take the California bar examination. As he left the final session of the examination, he was abducted and taken to a motel room by “deprogrammers” hired by his parents. After three days of deprogramming, Molko terminated his association with the Unification Church, and later sued the church for fraud and outrageous conduct. The second individual was a female college student who also had been “recruited” while waiting for a bus. Her experiences were similar to Molko’s, except that she ended up selling flowers on the streets of Los Angeles from 7AM until midnight. She, too, eventually became a member, and was abducted by deprogrammers (hired by her parents) who successfully persuaded her to abandon the Church. Both former members sued the Church for fraud and outrageous conduct. The court concluded that the Church could be sued for fraud if the former members could prove that the Church intentionally made misrepresentations of fact with an intent to defraud them, and they in fact relied on those misrepresentations. The court rejected the Church’s claim that it could not be guilty of fraud since the individuals both became members of the Church after they had learned its true identity. If the members could establish that the Church’s “brainwashing” activities rendered them incapable of not joining the Church, then they could sue for fraud. In rejecting the Church’s claim that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom precluded the former members from suing it on the basis of fraud, the court observed: “Although liability for deceptive recruitment practices imposes a marginal burden on the Church’s free exercise of religion, the burden is justified by the compelling state interest in protecting individuals and families from the substantial threat to public safety, peace and order posed by the fraudulent induction of unconsenting individuals into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion.” The court also concluded that the former members could sue the Church for “outrageous conduct” (or intentional infliction of emotional distress) if they could establish that the Church’s conduct was outrageous, and was committed with an intent to cause emotional distress. However, the court cautioned that outrageous conduct could not be based on threats of divine retribution for leaving the Church, since such threats are protected by the guaranty of religious freedom. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Further developments in this case will be noted in future editions of Church Law & Tax Report. Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 3

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

A New Jersey state appeals court upheld the validity of a city’s “Sunday closing law.” The court noted that the ordinance had been adopted, by the city of Paramus, to “achieve a reduction of traffic … and afford the residents of Paramus a day of rest and relaxation from the everyday hustle and bustle in order to preserve and uplift the public health, safety, and welfare of the borough and its inhabitants.” Such purposes, concluded the court, were permissible justifications for a Sunday closing law. The court disagreed with the contentions of several merchants that the law in question (1) was unlawfully discriminatory, (2) violated the merchants’ first amendment right to “commercial speech,” (3) was overbroad, (4) was too vague, (5) imposed an unlawful burden on commerce, and (6) was invalid due to lax and inconsistent enforcement. Mack Paramus Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 549 A.2d 474 (N.J. Super. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 2

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Can a secular business that is owned by evangelical Christians compel employees to attend weekly devotional services during working hours? That was the issue before a federal appeals court in a recent case. Townley Manufacturing Company was established in 1963 to manufacture mining equipment. Its owners made a “covenant” with God that there business “would be a Christian, faith-operated business.” The “covenant with God” is reflected in a number of ways—including the enclosure of Gospel tracts in every piece of outgoing mail, the printing of Bible verses on company invoices, support of various churches and missionaries, and weekly devotional services during working hours. An employee handbook specified that “all employees are required to attend the non-denominational devotional services each Tuesday. Employees are paid for their time while attending these services.” In 1979, Townley hired an atheist who signed an statement agreeing to abide by the employee handbook. Soon after starting work, the atheist asked to be excused from attending the weekly devotional services. His supervisor told him that attendance was mandatory, but that he was free to sleep or read a newspaper during the services. A short time later, the individual filed a religious discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC charged Townley with violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, the EEOC objected to the requirement that all employees attend devotional services, and the company’s failure to “accommodate” the employee’s objection to attending services. A federal trial court prohibited all mandatory devotional services at Townley’s plant, and Townley appealed. The appeals court ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee on the basis of religion, and further requires employers to “accommodate” the religious practices of employees so long as such accommodation does not result in undue hardship to the employer. The court concluded that Townley had violated Title VII by refusing to make any effort to accommodate the employee’s objection to devotional services. It acknowledged that an employer need not accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if such accommodation would result in “undue hardship” to the conduct of the employer’s business, but it concluded that accommodating an employee’s desire to be excused from attending devotional services would not result in any “undue hardship” to the conduct of Townley’s business. The court also rejected Townley’s contention that the employee, by signing the statement agreeing to abide by Townley’s policies, had “waived” his rights under Title VII. It noted that the “Supreme Court has stated that ‘there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.'” Finally, the court acknowledged that “religious corporations” are exempt from Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination in employment, but it rejected Townley’s claim that it was a religious corporation. Specifically, the court observed that “the company is for profit,” produced a “secular product,” was “not affiliated with or supported by a church,” and its charter did not mention religion in reciting the company’s corporate purposes. The court emphasized that the company was free to conduct weekly devotional services, and could even make them mandatory with respect to all employees who did not have religious objections to attending them. E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 4

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a state Sunday closing law violated the Virginia Constitution’s prohibition against “special laws.” Virginia enacted its first Sunday closing law in 1610. During the colonial period, this law had a religious purposes, requiring every person “to repair in the morning to the divine service.” During the Revolutionary War, in 1779, a Sunday closing law was substituted that had an entirely “secular” purpose—to “prevent the physical and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor.” The 1779 law survived until 1960, when the state legislature enacted a new law. In 1974, the legislature completely rewrote the Sunday closing law. The 1974 law generally prohibited commercial establishments to do business on Sunday, but exempted more than 60 “industries and businesses” from the prohibition, and permitted cities and counties to exempt themselves entirely from the law by a referendum vote. These exemptions left only about 20% of the Virginia workers subject to the law. Under these facts, the state supreme court concluded that the 1974 law violated a provision in the Virginia Constitution prohibiting “special laws” exempting private companies from the reach of any general law unless the exemption bore “a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation.” The court noted that the purpose of the law was to provide the people of Virginia with a common day of rest, and concluded that the exemption of 80% of the business and employees in the state from the reach of the Sunday closing law clearly indicated that the many exemptions did not bear a reasonable relationship to the object sought to be accomplished by the law. Accordingly, the law violated the ban on special legislation. The court further held that the Virginia law did not violate the United States Constitution’s guaranty of the “equal protection of the laws,” since such a standard was more easily satisfied than the state constitution’s “special laws” provision. Accordingly, other states will not be able to rely on the Virginia court’s decision unless their state constitutions contain a similar ban on special legislation. Benderson Development Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751 (Va. 1988).

Related Topics:

Freedom of Religion – Part 1

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-03-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Can a county hospital hire a full-time chaplain who is paid with tax revenues? Yes, concluded a federal appeals court in a significant decision. A county hospital in Iowa hired a full-time chaplain in 1984 after a volunteer chaplaincy program proved inadequate to meet patients’ needs. Fifty percent of the hospital’s inpatient population were in a psychiatric ward, and many of these patients had been committed involuntarily and were not free to leave at will. The hospital also confined prisoners who were referred to it for treatment or evaluation. The chaplain’s duties included calling on patients prior to surgery, being available for counseling in intensive care and surgery waiting rooms, visiting patients who requested a visit, and conducting worship services and a Bible study class for patients who chose to attend. The court concluded that the act of hiring the chaplain did not violate the first amendment’s “nonestablishment of religion” clause, since it served a valid secular purpose, did not have a primary effect of advancing religion, and did not unduly entangle church and state. The court emphasized that the hospital practiced a “wholistic” approach to medicine, which recognizes that a patient’s overall health and recovery is based on spiritual as well as physical and emotional conditions, and accordingly that spiritual needs must be addressed in the lives of patients who express an interest. Such an approach, concluded the court, constituted a permissible “secular purpose” and precluded a finding that the primary effect of the chaplaincy program was the advancement of religion. The court emphasized that the chaplain “avoided proselytizing” and engaged in no “direct advancement” of religion by “inculcating any religious belief or practice.” The court further held that “the chaplaincy is a permissible accommodation of at least some patients’ free exercise [of religion] rights. There was evidence that a large percentage of patients were prisoners or had been involuntarily committed … in the psychiatric ward. Such restrictions constitute a state-imposed burden on the patients’ religious practices that the state may appropriately adjust for.” The court permitted the chaplain to counsel with outpatients and with the families of patients, but prohibited the chaplain from engaging in religious counseling with hospital employees (secular counseling with employees was permitted). Finally, the court ruled that (1) the chaplain could not review the medical records of any patient without that person’s consent, (2) the chaplain could wear a name tag and park in a reserved lot, (3) the hospital could use an admissions form that permitted patients to list their religious preference, and (4) the practice of conducting optional religious services was permissible. Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988).

Related Topics:

Freedom of Religion – Part 1

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Many churches use public school facilities on a temporary basis (and during noninstructional hours) during the construction or renovation of their own facilities. Many other churches have considered such a practice. Are such arrangements legal? That was the issue before a federal appeals court in New York in a recent case. A church applied for and was granted permission to use a public school building on four consecutive Sundays while its own church facility was being renovated. During the four week period, the church applied for a permit to use the school facilities for an additional “six to eight months.” This permit was denied, and a trial court granted the church’s request for an injunction forcing the school district to issue the requested permit. On appeal, the school district defended its refusal to grant the permit by pointing to a New York law that prohibits public school properties from being used for “meetings … where admission fees are charged … if such meetings are under the exclusive control, and said proceeds are to be applied for the benefit of … a religious sect or denomination.” The court acknowledged that this language was inconsistent with church use of public school property. However, it concluded that the school district had “opened this forum to [the church] through a practice of granting permits to use public school facilities to other religious organizations.” The court also rejected the school district’s argument that granting the permit to the church would constitute an impermissible “establishment of religion” in violation of the first amendment. It noted that “the semblance of official support is less evident where a school building is used at night as a temporary facility by religious organizations, under a program that grants access to all charitable groups.” Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Board of Education, 852 F.2d 676 (2nd Cir. 1988).

Freedom of Religion – Part 2

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments Freedom of Religion Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M.,

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments

Freedom of Religion

Can a public high school science teacher be dismissed for repeatedly making references to religion in his classes over the objections of his students and superintendent? Yes, concluded a Pennsylvania state court. The teacher allegedly had made numerous references in his classes to God, Christianity, demons, devils, prophesies from the book of Revelation, and hell. He allegedly required one student (who had been temporarily ousted from class for disciplinary reasons) to pray with him in a hallway as a condition of reentering the room, and informed his classes that “God is truth and truth is God.” The teacher was warned repeatedly that his actions could lead to his dismissal. When asked pointblank if he would stop imposing his religious views on his classes, he answered “no,” and explained that he “was a Christian and that part of his mission was in a sense evangelistic.” The teacher was dismissed, and challenged his dismissal in court. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that the dismissal had been appropriate. It observed that “where a teacher indicates his preference for a particular type of religion and seeks to promote that religion or any religion among his students, the teacher’s constitutional right to freedom of religion and speech must give way to our country’s historic [nonestablishment of religion] clause] set forth in the first amendment.” The court acknowledged that discussions in public schools “about religion, where relevant to classroom course material, are permissible,” but it concluded that the teacher’s conduct “exceeded the constitutional boundaries within which discourse about religion is permissible.” Rhodes v. Laurel High School District, 544 A.2d 562 (Pa. Common. 1988).

Schools – Part 1

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments Schools Richard R. Hammar, J.D., LL.M., CPA •

Church Law and Tax 1989-01-01 Recent Developments

Schools

A federal district court in New York ruled that a state law governing “homeschooling” did not violate the constitutional right of fundamentalist Christian parents to the free exercise of their religion. The law in question requires that educational services provided to a minor “elsewhere than at a public school shall be at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given to minors of like age and attainments at the public schools.” The law also requires that homeschooling be conducted by “competent” instructors, and calls for periodic standardized testing and the approval of a homeschool’s curriculum and textbooks. Visits of homes in which homeschooling occurs is also mandated. A group of parents challenged the law, contending that the state “did not have jurisdiction” over their children’s education. In particular, the parents maintained that their religious beliefs compelled them to give their children a religious education in which religious values are “interwoven” into every area of study, and that the New York law violated their right to religious freedom by reserving unto the state the power to approve or disapprove the manner in which they accomplished the religious education of their children. The court acknowledged that “it is with trepidation that [we] interfere with the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that the state’s interest in ensuring an adequate education for its citizens was sufficiently compelling to justify the legal restrictions on homeschooling. The court observed: “Unless a child is a member of an identifiable religious sect with a long history of maintaining a successful community separate and apart from American society in general, it must be assumed that the child must be intellectually, socially, and psychologically prepared to interact with others who may not share the views of the parents in the [present case]. A state’s interest in establishing standards for the education of its young in order to prepare them for participation in American political and economic processes as well as to nurture and develop their human potential overrides the interest of parents to teach their children in a religious school or at home free from governmental interference.” The court acknowledged that the parents feared that the state would require them to teach secular matters inconsistent with their religious beliefs. While acknowledging that “there may be cases in which the manner the state enforces the mandate of [the law] unnecessarily infringes the free exercise rights of particular parents.” However, “the mere possibility that such cases might arise is not enough to invalidate” the state law. As a result, the court rejected the parents’ challenge to the constitutionality of the New York law. Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).

Court Ruled That a Virginia Law Exempting Church-Operated Childcare Facilities from State Licensing Did Not Violate the Nonestablishment of Religion Clause

A federal appeals court ruled that a Virginia law exempting church-operated childcare facilities from state

A federal appeals court ruled that a Virginia law exempting church-operated childcare facilities from state licensing did not violate the constitution's nonestablishment of religion clause. The law was enacted in response to the contentions of several churches that their religious beliefs would not permit them to apply for or accept a state license to carry out a function that they considered to be an integral part of their religious ministry.

A group of childcare providers without religious affiliation challenged the law in court on the ground that it placed them at an unfair competitive disadvantage. The appeals court upheld the validity of the Virginia exemption largely on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision (in Amos v. Presiding Bishop) upholding the exemption of churches from the prohibition of religious-based discrimination in employment.

The court quoted from the Amos decision: "A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to [violate the nonestablishment clause] it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence." The Virginia law, concluded the appeals court, did not amount to an impermissible advancement of religion by the state. Rather, it was a permissible "accommodation of the exercise of religion."

The court, in rejecting the contention that a single exemption of church-operated facilities rendered the law invalid, again quoted from the Amos decision: "Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no need to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities."

The court also noted that "absent the exemption, some church leaders would immediately be forced to violate their convictions against submitting aspects of their ministries to state licensing, or face legal action by the state. This would be an unseemly clash of church and state which the legislature might well wish to avoid."

Finally, the court emphasized that the civil courts are not equipped to determine whether the operation of childcare facilities by a church is a secular or religious activity, and therefore they cannot reject a church's claim that such facilities promote its religious purposes. Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988)

Court Upheld the Application of the Fire Safety Provisions of a State Boarding House Law to a Rescue Mission

The New Jersey supreme court upheld the application of the fire safety provisions of a

The New Jersey supreme court upheld the application of the fire safety provisions of a state boarding house law to a rescue mission. The law in question was enacted in 1979 because of a number of fatal boarding house fires.

In rejecting the mission's claim that it was not subject to the fire safety provisions of the law, the court observed that "the state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." Protecting the residents of religious missions from fire hazards was an overriding governmental interest that outweighed any claim of religious freedom.

The court observed that "we suspect that had there been a fatal fire at a religious boarding house, society would not have shrugged its shoulders and concluded that the tragedy was of no moment since it had befallen a religious shelter. The state's legitimate concern for safety need not end at the shelter's door."

The court also upheld provisions in the law giving the state the authority to oversee and review the day-to-day operations of the mission, and to strike down any rule or practice it deemed unreasonable. However, the court emphasized that the "regulatory scheme cannot require such comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" as would result in an excessive entanglement between church and state. And, the court warned that "should the [state] exercise its discretion in a manner that unnecessarily intrudes into the mission's religious affairs, we shall promptly reconsider the matter."

Market Street Mission v. Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards, 541 A.2d 668 (N.J. 1988)

Court Concluded Employer Discriminated Against Discharged Employee on the Basis of His Religious Beliefs

Can an employee be terminated for his refusal (based on religious beliefs) to work on

Can an employee be terminated for his refusal (based on religious beliefs) to work on Sundays? That was the difficult question before a federal appeals court.

When hired, the employee (who was a member of the Church of God) explained to his employer that he could not work on Sundays because it would violate his religious beliefs. He was advised working on Sundays was purely voluntary. However, a few years later, the employer experienced a substantial increase in business, and it was forced to operate on some Sundays.

The employee was ordered to work on a number of Sundays, and on each occasion he refused. He eventually was terminated, and later sued the employer for its alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits most employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of religion unless they can demonstrate that they are "unable to reasonably accommodate" an employee's religious beliefs "without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."

The court concluded that the employer had in fact violated Title VII, since it had discriminated against the discharged employee on the basis of his religious beliefs, but had failed to make any attempt to "reasonably accommodate" those beliefs. In particular, the court observed that several other employees testified that they would have been willing to work on Sundays in place of the discharged employee if they had been asked.

The court rejected the employer's claim that it had no duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee who absolutely refused to work on Sundays, since the employer's position "turns the statute on its head. It improperly places the burden on the employee to be reasonable rather than on the employer to attempt accommodation." Even an absolute refusal to work on Sundays "requires some offer of accommodation by employers," concluded the court.

E.E.O.C. v. Ithaca Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1988)

Court Rejected Religious School’s Claim That It Was Exempt from Federal Age Discrimination Law

A federal district court in Ohio rejected a religious school's claim that it was exempt

A federal district court in Ohio rejected a religious school's claim that it was exempt from federal age discrimination law.

Xavier University is a Catholic institution of higher education operated by the Order of Jesuits. An employee brought an age discrimination lawsuit against the University. The University claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case, since, as a religious institution, it was exempt from the antidiscrimination provisions of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").

The court agreed with the employee that the ADEA "gives no indication that religious institutions are exempt from its provisions." However, it also acknowledged that a religious institution could be exempted on the basis of the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom if application of the ADEA to the institution would "give rise to serious constitutional questions" under the religious freedom clause of the first amendment. The court concluded that no "serious constitutional questions" were implicated by an application of the ADEA to the University and accordingly the claim of an exemption was rejected.

In 1979, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not apply to church-operated schools since serious constitutional questions would be implicated by an application of the Act to such schools, and there was no evidence of an "affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed" for church-operated schools to be covered under the Act. This test for evaluating the application of federal laws to church-controlled schools has not been successfully applied in other contexts. Perhaps it will remain limited to union organizing efforts under the NLRA.

Soriano v. Xavier University, 687 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Ohio 1988)

Court Concluded a Counselor’s Free Exercise of Religion Did Not Permit Him to Use Religious Counseling Methods

Can a juvenile court counselor be fired for using a "Christian perspective" in counseling emotionally

Can a juvenile court counselor be fired for using a "Christian perspective" in counseling emotionally disturbed adolescents? Yes, concluded a federal court in Virginia.

The counselor, who was a county employee, was discharged for his "stubborn insistence upon injecting his religious views into his counseling against the wishes of his superiors." The counselor sued the county, claiming that his discharge violated his constitutional right to religious freedom.

In rejecting this claim, the court observed that the counselor's right to exercise his religion was not absolute, but had to be balanced against the state's duty to avoid violating the first amendment's nonestablishment of religion clause and protecting the religious beliefs of others. The court concluded that "when the exercise of an individual's first amendment rights potentially violates free exercise rights of others or the mandates of the establishment clause, the individual's rights are not absolute. On the facts of this case, the court concludes that [the counselor's] constitutional right to the free exercise of his religion does not go so far as to permit him to use religious counseling methods against the orders of his superiors."

This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the counselor was in a position of trust and his clients, "all of whom were young and many of whom were troubled, were a captive, impressionable audience." The court also observed that the counselor's behavior raised questions as to his suitability to work with emotionally disturbed youth. In particular, the court observed that the counselor had called one of his supervisors an "evil witch," encouraged clients to "go with The Force" (an allusion to the Star Wars films), and sent his superiors a letter accusing them of "crucifying the word and intention of the Lord as it was acting through him" (a copy of this letter was sent to President Reagan, Pope John Paul, and Billy Graham).

This case illustrates the danger of using government employment to engage in proselytizing. Cases upholding the legality of government chaplains serving the military, prisons, and tax-subsidized hospitals have similarly suggested that active proselytizing may raise questions as to the legality of such positions.

Langlotz v. Picciano, 683 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Va. 1988)

Court Concluded That a Church’s Religious Freedom Claim Was Outweighed by a Compelling State Interest—the “Broad Public Interest in Maintaining a Sound Tax System”

Is property acquired by a church after the "tax assessment date," and used exclusively for

Is property acquired by a church after the "tax assessment date," and used exclusively for religious purposes, subject to local property taxes?That was the question before a New Jersey state appeals court.

Under New Jersey law, the taxable or exempt status of any tract of property is determined as of the tax assessment date (October 1 of the preceding calendar year). A church purchased property on December 12, 1983, and used it immediately for exclusively religious purposes. The church applied for a tax exemption, but was informed that no exemption would be available for calendar year 1984 since the property was not owned by the church as of October 1, 1983.

The church claimed that it was doctrinally opposed, on the basis of biblical passages, to paying taxes with funds obtained from tithes and contributions, and accordingly, that requiring the church to pay property taxes for 1984 would violate the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. The court acknowledged that "the free exercise of religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the tribute which is exacted." However, it also noted that "it is equally well-settled that religious groups are not free from all financial burdens of government" and that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."

A state may "justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest" and there exists "no less restrictive means" of achieving the state's interest. The court emphasized that the issue was not the tax-exempt status of church property—since New Jersey law clearly exempted such properties from tax. Rather, the issue was whether or not the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom requires church-owned property to be exempt from taxation the moment it is acquired.

The court concluded that the church's religious freedom claim was outweighed by a compelling state interest—the "broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system." Specifically, the court observed that "mid-year cancellation of tax liability by reason of a property so listed becoming exempt during the year would result in major dislocation and an unfair burden to the remaining taxpayers." Further, "a requirement imposed by the [courts] mandating that property acquired by an exempt owner must receive an exemption at the exact time of its acquisition would severely impair the ability of the tax authorities to predict revenues for the tax year."

In conclusion, the court observed that the maintenance of "an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good."

Bethany Baptist Church v. Deptford Township, 542 A.2d 505 (N.J. Super. 1988)

Court Ruled City’s Refusal to Permit an Islamic Center to Operate within City Limits Violated the Guaranty of Religious Freedom

A federal appeals court decision strongly supports the right of churches to locate in residential

A federal appeals court decision strongly supports the right of churches to locate in residential districts. The court ruled that a city's refusal to permit an Islamic center to operate within city limits near a university campus violated the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

A city zoning ordinance prohibited the use of any building as a church in all areas of the city near a university campus unless a special permit was obtained from the city council. Twenty-five churches were granted permits to operate in restricted areas. However, the Islamic center's request for a permit was denied. No reason was given for the denial, though a neighborhood spokesman expressed concern over "congestion, parking, and traffic problems."

The center sued the city, arguing that the city's action in banishing it from the restricted area near the university campus, while allowing 25 churches to meet in the same area, violated the right of Muslims to the free exercise of their religion. The city denied that the Muslims' rights were violated, since "they can establish a mosque … outside the city limits or buy cars and ride to more distant places within the city."

The federal appeals court observed that the city's suggestion was "reminiscent of Anatole France's comment on the majestic equality of the law that forbids all men, the rich as well as the poor, to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." The court further observed that "laws that make churches accessible only to those affluent enough to travel by private automobile obviously burden the free exercise of religion by the poor." And, while "the constitution does not forbid all governmental regulation that imposes an incidental burden on worship by making the free exercise of religion more difficult or more expensive," once it is established that a governmental action burdens religious exercise, "the government must offer evidence of an overriding interest" to justify its action.

In this case, however, the city "advanced no rational basis other than the neigborhood opposition to show why the [permit] granted all other religious centers was denied the Islamic center …. [N]eighbors' negative attitudes or fears, unsubstantiated by factors properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not a permissible basis" for denying a permit. Further, the court concluded that the city had acted improperly in "applying different standards" to the Islamic center than to the "worship facilities of other faiths."

This decision is binding authority in federal courts located within the fifth federal circuit, which includes the states of Texas, Lousiana, and Mississippi. Churches in these states that face antagonistic zoning boards should profit from this decision. Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. Starkville, 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988)

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